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Abstract - The concept lattice of a coalitional game form is introduced and advocated as a structural 
classificatory tool. The basic properties of such lattices are studied. Sufficient concept-latticial properties for 
convexity of the underlying coalitional game form are identified. Spectral issues concerning widths and 
lengths of concept lattices of convex CGFs are also addressed. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the last few decades a huge ﬂow of literature on implementation theory and
mechanism design has provided an impressive amount of detailed knowledge on
the behaviour of the games induced by certain game forms on a few typical
preference domains, and with respect to a wide variety of both non-cooperative
and cooperative solution concepts. As an implicit by-product of this work, a
lot has been learnt on ways of classifying game forms from that behavioural
perspective. By contrast, virtually no attention has been devoted to the task
of classifying game forms as such, with no reference to the behaviour of the
games they may induce on certain preference domains. To be sure, in some
previous work of mine (see e.g. Vannucci (1999)) concept lattices of eﬀectivity
functions were introduced and used in order to provide structural classiﬁcations
of the latter in terms of the allocation of a priori coalitional power they induce,
quite independently of the preference domain they are meant to be applied to.
It goes without saying that, generally speaking, the ensuing ‘structural’ classi-
ﬁcations of game forms need not be related to the former, ‘behavioural’ ones,
which arise from their performance with respect to certain solution concepts on
prespeciﬁed environments. However, it is also not clear why such ‘structural’
and ‘behavioural’ classiﬁcations of game forms should be indeed ‘orthogonal’
or totally unrelated. Indeed, one should not rule out that some connections
-perhaps interesting ones- do exist between those two types of classiﬁcations of
game forms.
In this paper, concept lattices of general coalitional game forms are ﬁrst
introduced, and their basic properties studied. Then, a preliminary exploration
of relationships between concept-latticial properties of game forms and their
behavioural performance is pursued. In particular, it is shown that if the concept
lattice of a coalitional game form is a chain and its closure systems obey certain
closure conditions w.r.t. the meet operation then the given coalitional game
form for must be convex, hence strongly core-stable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to introducing the
concept lattice of a coalitional game form with related notions. Section 3 in-
cludes the main result of the paper relating some concept-latticial properties
to convexity of the relevant coalitional game form. Section 4 consists of a few
concluding remarks.
2 The concept lattice of a coalitional game form
Let (N,X) be a pair of non-empty sets ( the sets of players and outcomes,
respectively; we also assume that N is ﬁnite,a n dt h a t#N ≥ 2 and #X ≥ 2
in order to avoid trivialities). A (monotonic) simple game on N is a set pair
(N,W) where W is a non-empty order ﬁlter of (P(N),⊇), the inclusion-ordered
power set of N (recall that an order ﬁlter of a partially ordered set (Y,≥) is
as e tU ⊆ Y such that for all u,y ∈ Y if u ∈ U and y ≥ u then y ∈ U): the
coalitions belonging to W are meant to represent the winning or all-powerful
1ones. A simple game (N,W) is said to be principal if W is a principal order
ﬁlter of (P(N),⊇) i.e. there exists S ⊆ N such that W = {T ⊆ N : T ⊇
S}. A coalitional game form(CGF) on (N,X) (with total domain) is a triple
G =( N,X,E) where E : P(N) → P(P(X)) is a function. A CGF G is
said to be normalized if E(∅)=∅, souvereign if there exists T ⊆ N such that
E(T) ⊇ P(X)\{∅}, exhaustive if X ∈ E(S) for any S, ∅ 6= S ⊆ N,a n dnon-
empty-valued if ∅ / ∈ E(S) for any S , ∅⊂S ⊆ N .A n eﬀectivity function
(EF) on (N,X) is a coalitional game form G =( N,X,E) which is normalized,
souvereign, exhaustive, and non-empty-valued.
AC G FG =(N,X,E) is monotonic if for any S,T ⊆ N and any A,B ⊆ X
[A ∈ E(S) and S ⊆ T entail A ∈ E(T)] and
[A ∈ E(S) and A ⊆ B entail B ∈ E(S)].
In what follows we shall be mainly concerned with monotonic EFs.
A monotonic CGF G =(N,X,E)) is regular if ∅ 6= A ∈ E(S) entails X\A/ ∈
E(N\S) for any S ⊆ N and B ⊆ X, maximal if A/ ∈ E(S) entails (X\A) ∈
E(N\S) for any ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and ∅ 6= A ⊆ X, essential if for any i ∈ N: E({i}) 6=
{A ⊆ X : A 6= ∅},a n dconsensual if for any S ⊂ N: E(S) 6= {A ⊆ X : A 6= ∅}.
Moreover, a CGF G =(N,X,E) is superadditive if for any S,T ⊆ N and
A,B ⊆ X, A ∈ E(S),B∈ E(T) and S ∩ T = ∅ entail A ∩ B ∈ E(S ∪ T),
convex if for any S,T ⊆ N and A,B ⊆ X if A ∈ E(S) and B ∈ E(T) then
A ∩ B ∈ E(S ∪ T) or A ∪ B ∈ E(S ∩ T),and additive if there exist positive
probability measures p,q on N,X respectively s.t. A ∈ E(S) iﬀ p(S)+q(A) > 1.
We shall also say that a CGF G =( N,X,E) is Ferrers if for any S,T ⊆ N ,
E(S) ⊆ E(T) or E(T) ⊆ E(S).
Finally, an EF G =(N,X,E) is simple if there exists a simple game (N,W)
such that for any S ⊆ N, A ⊆ X, A ∈ E(S) if and only if either A = X and
S 6= ∅ or A 6= ∅ and S ∈ W (notice that a simple EF is —by deﬁnition— both
well-behaved and monotonic). Indeed, a simple EF G =(N,X,E) is induced by
a simple game (N,W) as endowed with a ﬁxed outcome set X, and will also be
denoted G =(N,X,EW).
We are specially interested in those CGFs -indeed EFs- that can represent
the decision power of coalitions under a certain decision mechanism, or strategic
game form . A strategic game form on (N,X) is a tuple Γ =( N,X,(Si)i∈N,h)
where Si is the set of strategies available to player i ∈ N and h :
Q
i∈N Si → X
denotes the strategic outcome function.
Now, the notion of decision power admits at least two distinct interpreta-
tions, namely “guaranteeing power” and “counteracting power” that in turn
correspond to the ability to force maximin and minimax outcomes, respectively.
Thus, the allocation of “guaranteeing power” under strategic game form Γ is
represented by the α−EF of Γ - denoted by Eα(Γ)-a sd e ﬁned by the following





A ⊆ X:t h e r ee x i s t stS ∈
Q
i∈S Si exists such that
h(tS,s N\S) ∈ A







Conversely, the allocation of “counteracting power” under strategic game
2form G with domain D is represented by the β − EF of G, denoted by Eβ(G)
and deﬁned as follows :
for any non-empty S ⊆ N
(Eβ(Γ))(S)=
½
A ⊆ X : for any sN\S ∈
Q
i∈N\S Si there exists tS ∈
Q
i∈S Si
such that h(tS,s N\S) ∈ A
¾
.
It is easily checked that Eα(Γ) is regular, Eβ(Γ) is maximal, and both of
them are monotonic and - provided that G is non-empty valued- well-behaved
. Also, it is well-known that superadditivity and monotonicity of an EF G =
(N,X,E) is α-strategically playable i.e. there exists a strategic game form Γ
such that E = Eα(Γ) : see e.g. Otten,Borm,Storcken and Tijs(1995)) . Indeed,
monotonicity of α−EFsand β−EFsof strategic game forms is our main reason
for conﬁning the ensuing analysis to monotonic EFs (as mentioned previously).
It is easily checked that : i) the set of all EFs on (N,X) is bijective to
a set of binary relations on (P(N),P(X)) : hence any EF G =( N,X,E) can
be equivalently regarded as a binary relation ; ii) therefore, the classic Birkhoﬀ
theorem on so called Galois connections applies. It follows that the functions
fE : P(P(N)) → P(P(X)),g E : P(P(X)) → P(P(N)) as deﬁned by the rules
fE(S)={A ⊆ X : A ∈ E(S) for any S ∈ S} for any S ⊆P(N),a n d
gE(A)={S ⊆ N : A ∈ E(S) for any A ∈ A}
enjoy the following list of properties:
a) the functions KE = gE ◦fE and K∗
E = fE ◦gE are closure operators on
(P(N),⊇) and (P(X),⊇), respectively (we recall here that a (Moore) closure
operator on a preordered set (Y,≥) is a function K : Y → Y such that for any
y,z ∈ Y : K(y) ≥ y; y ≥ z entails K(y) ≥ K(z) ; K(y) ≥ K(K(y)) ).
b) the corresponding closure systems - i.e. sets of closed sets - C(KE)=
{S ⊆ P(N):S = KE(S)}, C(K∗
E)={A ⊆ P(X):A = K∗
E(A)} are (dually
isomorphic) complete lattices under the join and meet operations deﬁned as
follows:
for any {Si}i∈I ⊆ C(KE), {Ai}i∈I ⊆ C(K∗
E),





(we recall that a lattice is a partially ordered set (L,≥) such that for any
pair {x,y} ⊆ L , both a greatest lower bound (glb) -or meet- ∧{x,y}and a
lowest upper bound (lub) - or join - ∨{x,y} exist; a lattice is complete if any
subset of L has both a glb and a lub ).
c) the lattices under b) are dense, i.e. have a unique atom and - if E is well-
behaved- co-dense, i.e. have a unique co-atom ( an atom of a lattice (L,≥) is
a ≥-minimal non-bottom element of L,a n daco-atom is-dually- a ≥-maximal
non-top element of L).
The concept or Galois lattice of a CGF G =( N,X,E) is
L(G)=( L(G)={(S,A):S = gE(A) and A =fE(S)},⊇) ,a n df o ra n y





Clearly enough, the concept lattice L(G) -that is also sometimes called the
Galois lattice of G- is lattice-isomorphic to the lattices of inclusion-ordered
3closure systems of G (see e.g. Barbut and Monjardet (1970) and Ganter and
Wille (1999)). Hence, L(G) is complete, has a unique atom if G is normalized
and a unique co-atom if G is non-empty-valued. Moreover, if G is Ferrers then
L(G) is a chain. Finally, it is clearly the case that ﬁniteness of the player set or
of the outcome set entails ﬁniteness of L(G).Those basic facts concerning L(G)
can be summarized by the following proposition (see also Vannucci(1999) for an
earlier specialized version of the same statement, and Ganter and Wille(1999)
for some related results on general concept lattices):
Proposition 1 Let G =(N,X,E) be a CGF. Then, a complete lattice L(G) -
the concept lattice of G -u n i q u e l yd e ﬁned up to isomorphisms- can be canonically
attached to G. Moreover, i) if G is normalized then L(G) is dense ; ii) if G
is non-empty-valued then L(G) is co-dense; iii) if G is Ferrers then L(G) is a
chain i.e. a linearly ordered set; iv) L(G) is ﬁnite whenever either N or X is
ﬁnite.
Remark 2 While for small ﬁnite N and X computing the concept lattice of a
CGF G =( N,X,E) may be easily compued by hand. For larger CGFs some
suitable algorithm is needed. A few algorithms for computing concept lattices
are presented and discussed in Ganter and Wille (1999), chpt.2.
Thus, it follows from the foregoing observations and results that a (complete)
lattice —the concept lattice—can be eﬀectively attached in a most ‘natural’ way to
each CGF. This fact opens up the opportunity to introduce ‘new’ classiﬁcations
of CGFs from a number of interesting perspectives, relying on suitable concept
lattice parameters. Of course, those parameters (such as width, length, size,
number of join and/or meet irreducibles) provide some complexity-evaluation
criteria concerning the structure of the underlying CGFs.
I recall here some relevant order- and lattice-theoretic notions. The width
w(P) of a poset P =( P,≥) is the (common) size of its largest antichains ( an
antichain of P is a set of pairwise ≥− incomparable elements). The length l(P)
of a poset P =( P,≥) is the least upper bound of the set of lengths of chains
included in P (a chain is a totally ordered set; the length of a chain of m +1
elements is m).
Thus, the width of the concept lattice of a CGF provides some summary
information on the maximum ‘degree’ of specialization of decision tasks that is
allowed by the given CGF. By contrast, the length of the concept lattice of a
CGF provides information on the number of layers of decision power induced
by the latter.
In particular, the notion of order-dimension is made available for CGFs
through their concept lattices. Indeed, let L =( L,≥) be a lattice. Then, the
order dimension dO(L) of L is given by the minimum positive integer h such
that there exist h chains (L,≥1),..,(L,≥h) with ≥= ∩h
i=1 ≥i. Therefore, for
any CGF G one may also posit dimG = dO(L(G)). Moreover, the following
fact —which is easily established as an immediate corollary of a well-known
result of formal concept analysis (see Ganter,Wille(1999))— entails that the order
4dimension of any ﬁnite CGF G can be in principle detected by direct inspection
of G:
Claim 3 Let G =(N,X,E) be a ﬁnite CGF. Then its order dimension is given





k ∈ Z+ : there exist
{Ei : P(N) → P(P(X)),E i is Ferrers : i =1 ,..,k}
such that E(S)=
Tk




Summing up, concept-latticial parameters such as width and length or or-
der dimension provide in a most succinct way some basic information on the
characteristic degrees of decentralization, specialization and hierarchization of
decision tasks among coalitions that are induced by a given game form or de-
cision mechanism. The resulting classiﬁcations of CGFs may well turn out to
be at odds with more conventional classiﬁcations which are typically inspired
by behavioural performance of CGFs in certain environments and with respect
to certain solution concepts as explained above, or simply by more ‘superﬁcial’
features of the CGFs themselves. The following example may help clarify this
point.
Example 4 Let G1 =( N,X,EW1), G2 =( N,X,EW2) be simple CGFs with
#N ≥ 3, #X ≥ 3,W 1 = {S ⊆ N : i∗ ∈ S} for some i∗ ∈ N, W2 = {S ⊆ N :
#S ≥ b#N/2c +1 }. Clearly enough G1is a dictatorial game form, while G2
is a simple majority game form. The second one is anonymous, while the ﬁrst
one is deﬁnitely not. Moreover, their performance with respect to many typical
solution concepts- including the core- is dramatically diﬀerent. However, it is
easily checked that L(G1)=L(G2)=4, the four-element chain.
One should not conclude, however, that concept-latticial features of a CGF
are totally unrelated to their behavioural performance with respect to standard
solution concepts. The next section will be devoted to the exploration of one
signiﬁcant link between certain concept-latticial features of a CGF and its core-
stability properties.
3 Concept lattices and convexity
As mentioned above in the Introduction, one should like to be able to relate
concept-latticial classiﬁc a t i o n so fC G F st os t a n d a r dsolutions and solution con-
cepts of the relevant CGF-induced coalitional games. One such link is provided
by the next Proposition which relates some features of the concept lattice of
a CGF to convexity of the latter which is in turn a well-known suﬃcient con-
dition for core-stability of a CGF (see e.g. Peleg (1984), Abdou and Keiding
(1991)). Moreover, one should like to know whether convexity entails structural
restrictions on the Galois lattice of a CGF
Af e wm o r ed e ﬁnitions are in order here, namely:
5Deﬁnition 5 A monotonic CGF G =(N,X,E) is semi-principal if for any pair
S,A such that S =gE(A),A =fE(S)- i.e. S,A are isomorphically related closed
families of coalitions and events- it must be the case that at least one of the
following conditions holds: i) S is a principal order ﬁlter of (P(N),⊇), ii)A is
a principal order ﬁlter of (P(X),⊇).
Deﬁnition 6 As e m i - p r i n c i p a lC G FG =(N,X,E) is quasi-principal if for any
pair S,S
0 of KE-closed families of coalitions such that S is not a principal order
ﬁlter and S0 ⊂ S i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tS ∩ S0 ∈ S for any S ∈ S and any
S0 ∈ S0.
Remark 7 A semi-principal CGF need not be quasi-principal. To see this con-
sider the CGF G =(N,X,E) deﬁned as follows: E(∅)=∅ and there exist
x,y ∈ X such that for any S ⊆ N,A ⊆ X, A ∈ E(S) iﬀ one of the follow-
ing clauses is satisﬁed: i) S = N and A 6= ∅; ii) #S > #N − 1 and x ∈ A; iii)
#S > #N − 2 and {x,y} ⊆ A;i v ) S 6= ∅ and A = X.
By construction G is a monotonic EF which is semi-principal (and Fer-
rers, with concept lattice L(G)=6) but not quasi-principal. Indeed, posit
S = {S ⊆ N :# S > #N − 2} and S0 = {S ⊆ N :# S > #N − 1}. It is eas-
ily checked that both S and S0 are closed sets of the Galois closure opera-
tor on P(N) induced by G. Also, both of them are non-principal order ﬁl-
ters of (P(N),⊇) and clearly S0 ⊂ S. However, for any distinct i,j,k ∈ N,
N\{i,j} ∈ S,N\{k} ∈ S0while N\{i,j} ∩ N\{k} / ∈ S.
We are now ready to state the result announced above, namely
Proposition 8 Let G =( N,X,E) b eaC G Fw h i c hi sb o t hF e r r e r sa n dq u a s i -
principal. Then G is convex.
Proof. Let A ∈ E(S) and B ∈ E(T).To begin with, notice that for any
(C,C
∗) ∈ L(G) there exist T,A such that (C,C
∗)=( KE(T),fE(T)))=
(gE(A),K∗
E(A)) (see e.g. Ganter and Wille (1999) ). Then, posit KE({S})=
KE(S), KE({T})=KE(T) for some S,T ⊆ P(N).If both KE(S) and KE(T)
are principal then there exist U,V ⊆ N such that KE(S)={S0 ⊆ N : S0 ⊇ U},
and KE(T)={S0 ⊆ N : S0 ⊇ V }.But then, since G is Ferrers, it must be
t h ec a s et h a tKE(S) ⊆ KE(T) or KE(S) ⊆ KE(T) i.e. by deﬁnition U ⊇ V
or V ⊇ U. Let us suppose w.l.o.g. that U ⊇ V.It follows that S ⊇ U ⊇ V
whence S ∩ T ∈ KE(T).Therefore, by deﬁnition, E(S ∩ T) ⊇ fE(T). Since
-by construction- B ∈ fE(T), it also follows that B ∈ E(S ∩ T), hence-by
monotonicity- A ∪ B ∈ E(S ∩ T). If neither KE(S) nor KE(T) are principal
then both fE(S) and fE(T) are, since G is semi-principal. Hence, there exist
C,D ⊆ X such that fE(S)={A0 ⊆ X : A0 ⊇ C}and fE(T)={A0 ⊆ X : A0 ⊇
D}.Moreover, since G is Ferrers it follows that fE(S) ⊆ fE(T) or fE(T) ⊆
fE(S) i.e. C ⊇ D or D ⊇ C.Let us then suppose w.l.o.g. that C ⊇ D. Since, by
construction, A ∈ fE(S) and B ∈ fE(T), it follows that both A ⊇ D and B ⊇ D
i.e. A∩B ⊇ D.Now, D ∈ E(T), by construction. Therefore, A∩B ∈ E(S ∪T),
by monotonicity.
6Finally, if either KE(S) or KE(T)-but not both- are principal, two cases are
to be distinguished. First, let us suppose w.l.o.g. that KE(T) is principal i.e.
there exists V ⊆ N such that KE(T)={S0 ⊆ N : S0 ⊇ V }. Since G is Ferrers,
we know that either i) KE(S) ⊃ KE(T) or ii)KE(T) ⊃ KE(S).I f KE(S) ⊃
KE(T), then from quasi-principality of G it follows that S ∩ T ∈ KE(S),s i n c e
by construction S ∈ KE(S) and T ∈ KE(T).Therefore, A ∈ fE(S) ⊆ E(S ∩ T)
whence A ∪ B ∈ E(S ∩ T), by monotonicity. Conversely, if KE(T) ⊃ KE(S)
holds, then S ∈ KE(T) since by construction S ∈ KE(S).But then, S ⊇ V
whence S ∩ T ⊇ V (recall that T ∈ KE(T) by construction). Thus, S ∩ T ∈
KE(T) which entails that B ∈ fE(T) ⊆ E(S ∩ T). Hence A ∪ B ∈ E(S ∩ T),
by monotonicity.
Remark 9 It should be noticed that Proposition 8 is tight. To see this, con-
sider the following examples. First, consider G2 =( N,X,EW2) with #X ≥ 3
and W2 = {S ⊆ N :# S ≥ b#N/2c +1 } as deﬁned above (see Example
4). Clearly, G2 is Ferrers but it is neither quasi-principal nor convex. Next,
consider G =( N,X,E) with N = {1,2,3,4}, X = {x,y,z,w},#X =4 ,
a n ds u c ht h a tE(N)=P(X)\{∅},E(S)={Y ⊆ X : Y ⊇ X \{ z,w}} if
N 6= S ⊇ {1,2},E(S)={Y ⊆ X : Y ⊇ X \{ y,w}} if N 6= S ⊇ {1,3},
E(S)={Y ⊆ X : Y ⊇ X \{ x,w}} if N 6= S ⊇ {2,3},E (S)={X} if #S ≥ 1.
It can be checked that G is (trivially) quasi-principal but not Ferrers. More-
over, G is not convex: indeed, {x,y} ∈ E({1,2}) and {x,z} ∈ E({1,3}) but
{x} / ∈ E({1,2,3}) and {x,y,z} / ∈ E({1}).On the other hand, quasi-principality
and the Ferrers property are mutually consistent. A few examples of Fer-
rers quasi-principal eﬀectivity functions are presented and studied in Vannucci
(2002).
Conversely, neither the Ferrers property nor quasi-principality are necessary
conditions for convexity of a CGF. To see this, just consider the following
Example 10 Take CGF G =( N = {1,2},X = {a,b,c,d},E}) with E(N)=
P(X) \{ ∅},E({1})={Y ⊆ X : Y ⊇ {a,b} or Y ⊇ {c,d}} , E({2})={Y ⊆
X : Y ⊇ {a,c} or Y ⊇ {b,d}} and E(∅)=∅. Clearly, G is not Ferrers, by
construction. However, it is convex because for any S,T,Y,Z such that Y ∈
E(S) and Z ∈ E(T) either S ∩ T ∈ {S,T} (say, w.l.o.g. S ∩ T = T,w h e n c e
Y ∪ Z ∈ E(S ∩ T)=E(T))o rY ∩ Z 6= ∅ by construction, which entails that
Y ∩ Z ∈ E(S ∪ T)=E(N).
The link between Proposition 8, concept-latticial and core-stability proper-
ties of a CGF which has been repeatedly alluded to above is made explicit by
the following
Corollary 11 Let G =( N,X,E) be a quasi-principal CGF such that its con-
cept lattice L(G) is a chain. Then G is strongly core-stable on the set of all
N-proﬁles of total preorders on X.
7Thus, suﬃcient conditions for (strong) core-stability of a CGF may be es-
tablished in terms of properties of the concept lattice of the latter. Conversely,
such a result sheds some light on the (lack of) constraints that convexity of a
CGF imposes upon certain parameters (i.e. lenght and width) of its concept
lattice. This is the topic of the following section.
4 Spectral properties: how long and wide can
be the concept lattice of a convex CGF?
As mentioned above, concept-latticial parameters such as width and length or
order dimension provide in a most succinct way some basic information on the
characteristic degrees of decentralization, specialization and hierarchization of
decision tasks among coalitions that are induced by a given decision protocol.
I also submit that this last circumstance might be of particular signiﬁcance
for some possible future developments of an artiﬁcial-agent-supported implemen-
tation theory : indeed, suppose one is interested in
a) implementing a certain choice correspondence F (e.g. a cooperative bar-
gaining solution, or any other prescribed social choice rule as deﬁn e do na
domain of proﬁles of nonveriﬁable individual characteristics) via a distributed
mechanism, under
b) the additional constraint that the distributed mechanism is to ‘faithfully’
replicate the allocation of decision power embodied in the choice correspondence
itself, and (possibly) with
c) the opportunity to take advantage of suitably designed artiﬁcial agents
(e.g. artiﬁcial ‘mediators’ or ‘arbitrators’).
Now, replicating some (standard) eﬀectivity function of choice correspon-
dence F within the similar eﬀectivity function of a mechanism with extra added
agents is of course hopeless. Replicating the concept lattice of the relevant ef-
fectivity function of F , however, is not — and seems indeed to be a sensible and
attainable goal for ‘artiﬁcial-agent-augmented’ mechanisms.
Be it as it may, the intuitive meaning of concept latticial parameters of CGFs
as outlined above suggests an analysis of the relationship of such parameters to
core-stability and related properties of coalitional game forms, which are the
focus of a large part of the extant literature on coalitional games. This task is
best accomplished by asking— and answering— a few questions concerning spectral
properties of concept lattices of CGFs , namely questions of the following form:
• what are the possible values of a certain integer parameter t of the concept
lattice of a CGF G, when G is allowed to vary among the CGFs satisfying a
given property p?
In view of the well-known fact that convex EFs are strongly core-stable, we
address spectral concerning the lengths and widths of their concept lattices. We
have the following results, which rely heavily on the classic Sperner’s theorem
and on the main result of the previous section of this paper, respectively:
.
8Proposition 12 Let N,X be ﬁnite sets such that t =m i n {#N,#X} is odd,
and let U ∈ {N,X} with #U = t.T h e n ,
for any positive integer k ≤ #
©




(monotonic) convex CGF G =( N,X,E) such that w(L(G)) = k.
Proof. Let t =2 h+1for some (positive) integer h, and assume w.l.o.g. that
t = n =# N.Now, a well-known extension of the classic Sperner’s theorem on an-
tichains that if Y is a ﬁnite set of odd cardinality then
©
S ⊆ Y :# S = 1
2[#(Y )+1 ]
ª
is an antichain of maximum size of (P(Y ),⊇) (see e.g. Anderson(1987), chpt. 1,
Theorem 1.2.2). Thus, take S =
©
S ⊆ N :# S = 1
2(n +1 )
ª
,and let #S =k, i.e.
S = {S1,..,Sk}.Next, choose a k-subset {x1,..,xk} of X and deﬁne a monotonic
EF G =( N,X,E) by the following rule: E(∅)=∅ and for any S ⊆ N,A ⊆ X,
A ∈ E(S) iﬀ one of the following clauses is satisﬁed: i) S = N and A 6= ∅; ii)
S ⊇ Si and A ⊇ X\{xi}; iii) S 6= ∅ and A = X. It is easily checked that indeed
w(L(G)) = k =m a x
©
w(L(G
0)) : G0 =( N,X,E0) is a CGF with min{#N,#X} = t
ª
.
To check convexity of G, assume A ∈ E(S),B ∈ E(T).The following three
cases must be distinguished: i) (S∩(N\Si) 6= ∅ for any Si ∈ S or (T∩(N\Si) 6= ∅
for any Si ∈ S. In this case, X ∈ {A,B} hence A∩B ∈ {A,B} which implies-by
monotonicity- A∩B ∈ E(S∪T); ii) there exists Si ∈ S such that both S ⊇ Si and
T ⊇ Si.If A∩B ∈ {A,B} then again A∩B ∈ E(S∪T).Otherwise, by deﬁnition
of E, A ∪ B = X : since S ∩ T ⊇ Si 6= ∅, it follows that A ∪ B ∈ E(S ∩ T);
iii) there exist Si,S j ∈ S such that Si ⊆ S and Sj ⊆ T, but Sh\(S ∩ T) 6= ∅
for any Sh ∈ S. In this case again, A ∪ B = X,b yd e ﬁnition of E.Therefore,
A ∪ B ∈ E(S ∩ T) since clearly S ∩ T 6= ∅,b yd e ﬁnition of S
Proposition 13 Let N,X be ﬁnite sets such that t =m i n{#N,#X}. Then,
there exists a monotonic convex G =( N,X,E) such that l(L(G)) = 2t.
Proof. It follows at once by Proposition 8 in the previous section, by con-
sidering an EF G =( N,X,E) as deﬁned by the following rule: E(∅)=∅ and
for any S ⊆ N,A ⊆ X, A ∈ E(S) iﬀ one of the following clauses is satis-
ﬁed: i) S = N and A 6= ∅;i i )S ⊇ {i1,..,ih} and A ⊇ X\{xj1,..,x js} where
xjl ∈ {f(i):i > il}, l =1 ,..,h), and f is a suitable bijection between two t-
subsets of N and X, respectively ; iii) S 6= ∅ and A = X.Indeed, such an EF is
both linear and (trivially) quasi-principal, hence -by Proposition 8- convex.
Thus, the foregoing propositions establish that the requirement of convexity
(hence of strong core stability) on a CGF does not entail by itself any structural
constraint on the width or length of the corresponding concept lattice. From
the point of view of mechanism design, that proposition amounts of course to
an interesting positive result.
95C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The concept lattice of a coalitional game form, and its parameters, provide use-
ful classiﬁcatory tools concerning intrinsic, ‘structural’ features of the former.
We have shown that whenever the concept lattice of a coalitional game form is
a chain and the elements of its ground set satisfy suitable closure conditions the
relevant coalitional game form is convex hence strongly core-stable on large con-
ventional domains of preference proﬁles. This is -we submit- a quite remarkable
and promising fact, which urges more research on possible further relationships
between purely structural features of a coalitional game form and its behavioural
performance.
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